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A B S T R A C T
Global resource scarcity has become a central policy concern, with predictions of rising populations, natural
resource depletion and hunger. The narratives of scarcity that arise as a result justify actions to harness resources
considered ‘underutilised’, leading to contestations over rights and entitlements and producing new scarcities.
Yet scarcity is contingent, contextual, relational and above all political. We present an analysis of three framings
– absolute, relative and political scarcity – associated with the intellectual traditions of Malthus, Ricardo and
Marx, respectively. A review of 134 global and Africa-specific policy and related sources demonstrates how
diverse framings of scarcity – what it is, its causes and what is to be done – are evident in competing narratives
that animate debates about the future of food and farming in Africa and globally. We argue that current
mainstream narratives emphasise absolute and relative scarcity, while ignoring political scarcity. Opening up
this debate, with a more explicit focus on political scarcities is, we argue, important; emphasising how resources
are distributed between different needs and uses, and so different people and social classes. For African settings,
seen as both a source of abundant resources and a site where global scarcities may be resolved, as well as where
local scarcities are being experienced most acutely, a political scarcity framing on the global land rush, and
resource questions more broadly, is, we suggest, essential.
1. Introduction
Understandings of what has been called the ‘global land rush’ – the
large-scale acquisition of land and other resources by governments,
agribusiness companies and financiers often in overseas territories –
have often been cast in terms of ‘scarcity’. A number of overlapping
narratives are at play. Commodities, be they food, feed or fuel, are
deemed scarce, and therefore sought in areas where land and water in
particular are seen to be relatively abundant. Advocates argue that this
involves taking advantage of global comparative advantages of demand
and supply to realise a ‘win-win’ situation, in which commodities are
supplied to those who need them, while those who have the resources
to produce them profit as well (e.g. Bell et al., 2012). However, others
argue that, as the world runs out of resources, increasing competition
potentially leads to processes of exclusion and conflict (e.g. Le Billon,
2012). Some narratives also suggest that, if environmental limits are
exceeded, dangers may arise, as we transgress some earth system
boundaries (e.g. Rockström et al., 2009).
What does the deployment of the term ‘scarcity’ in these narratives
imply?1 What are the theoretical underpinnings of different versions of
scarcity? And are there any alternatives to mainstream versions? In this
paper, we explore how scarcity is represented in policy debates, by
whom and to what ends. Through a qualitative review of key docu-
ments and other sources, we interrogate the knowledge politics of the
global land rush when investment activity and international concern
were at their peak, during 2007–2013. We argue that notions of scarcity
are presented as a deliberate political strategy, justifying resource
control, appropriation, dispossession, population restrictions and the
securing of exclusionary property rights (cf. McCarthy and Wolford,
2011; Hildyard, 2010; Mehta, 2010a, 2001; Hartmann, 2010; Xenos,
1989).
Pointing out the political nature of scarcity, however, is not a call to
relativism – real, material scarcities clearly exist – but an acceptance
that meanings and interpretations are co-constructed in particular
policy settings, in arenas of power and contestation (Bakker and Bridge,
2006; Bridge, 2009). There are winners and losers from different policy
narratives, as they have concrete effects, and shape outcomes of
struggles over resources. Scarcity narratives do not merely describe, but
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justify changes in access to and control over resources, in ways that
reallocate scarcities across regions and populations. The policy and
business narratives explored in this paper have fundamentally affected
the direction and outcomes of land investments, and the wider gov-
ernance responses, since the height of the global land rush. Narratives
and their underlying framings therefore really matter, making a deeper
look at the narratives being deployed in policy arenas around the global
land rush vitally important.
The paper starts with an introduction to the global land rush in
order to set the scene. We then discuss three theoretical framings of
scarcity derived from classical political economy, contrasting absolute,
relative and political scarcity. Next, we discuss our methodology and
how we explored framings and narratives of scarcity across 135 reports
and other sources focusing on land investments and agricultural de-
velopment, particularly in Africa. The following section presents the
results of our analysis, identifying four core themes of a dominant
narrative of the global land rush. The narrative is based on an under-
lying framing of scarcity that combines absolute and relative inter-
pretations to the almost total exclusion of the political. We discuss why
and how politics are excluded. In the final section, we turn to an ex-
ploration of what an alternative political scarcity framing might look
like, and its implications for the global land rush debate.
2. The global land rush
The recent land rush, sparked by the global financial, food and fuel
crises of 2007–2008, is but the latest in a series of cycles of land ac-
quisition in Africa – first in the colonial period when Africa was par-
titioned by global powers, and then in the 1980s with the far-reaching
economic liberalisation (Moyo et al., 2012). Various models of large-
scale commercial farming have been established (Hall et al., 2017;
Smalley, 2013), intensifying land transactions and, generating tenure
insecurity and land conflicts in many countries (White et al., 2012;
Edelman et al., 2013). Economic liberalisation policy reforms resulted
in the increased financialization of capital and an expansion of markets
and speculative activities around land globally (Fairbairn, 2015). In
addition, this period has seen a transformation of the world economic
and political order with the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa), allowing them to become key players in an
increasingly multi-polar world with wide engagements in land and
agriculture in Africa (Scoones et al., 2016; Hall, 2011).
The food and fuel price spikes in 2007–2008 provoked global alarm.
A long period of cheap resources seemed to be over. This hit consumers
hard, with food riots occurring in a number of countries. The UK’s
former chief scientific adviser, John Beddington, captured the imagi-
nation by describing a coming together of forces – rising demand for
food, water and fuel caused by population growth, urbanisation and
consumption changes, increasing shortages of those resources and the
challenges of climate change – that threaten to create a ‘perfect storm’
on a global scale (Beddington, 2009). References to resource scarcity
became commonplace at this time. Announcing a new report in 2011,
the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) claimed:
“Widespread degradation and deepening scarcity of land and water
resources have placed a number of key food production systems
around the globe at risk, posing a profound challenge to the task of
feeding a world population expected to reach 9 billion people by
2050” (FAO, 2011a, para. 1).
Over the past decade, investments in large-scale commercial farms –
often linked to ‘water grabs’, to guarantee irrigated production – have
accelerated (Borras et al., 2011; Mehta et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2015).
As we show below, such investments have often been justified in terms
of ‘scarcity’, with overseas investments focused on stable, secure and
sustainable supplies of food and fuel. These investments have involved
both food crop and biofuel production, and have occurred on a large
scale, although their extent and performance is widely disputed (Oya,
2013; Scoones et al., 2013). A large proportion of these are in Africa,
where the debate over the pros and cons has been intense (Deininger
and Byerlee, 2012; Cotula et al., 2014; Pedersen and Buur, 2016),
linked to wider discourses around investment, growth and Africa’s rise
(Obeng-Odoom, 2015a).
Globally, the policy debate intensified, with much discussion about
the drivers and consequences of the rush for scarce resources. The
European Commissions’ Report on Development for 2011/12,
Confronting Scarcity: Managing Water, Energy and Land for Inclusive and
Sustainable Growth, commented:
“Projected scarcities of food, water and energy, and the search for
investment opportunities to satisfy food security in an increasingly
global market, have led to growing pressure on land worldwide …
Large-scale land acquisitions are just one manifestation of the in-
creased pressure on land” (EU, 2012: 87).
Equally, the Washington-based International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) observed:
“Increased pressures on natural resources, water scarcity, export
restrictions imposed by major producers when food prices were
high, and growing distrust in the functioning of regional and global
markets have pushed countries short in land and water to find al-
ternative means of producing food” (IFPRI, 2009: 1).
The food-fuel-financial crisis of the late 2000s thus galvanised a
series of scarcity narratives justifying interventions around land and
resources. What were the underlying framings that guided these nar-
ratives, and from where were they derived? The next section explores
three frames for understanding scarcity, each suggesting very different
implications.
3. Understanding scarcity: three frames
How scarcities are understood – where, at what scale, in what
timeframe, for whom, in what context – is crucial for the con-
ceptualisation of and response to the global land rush. Ideas about
scarcity are of course fundamental to understandings of economics and
politics. From Thomas Malthus’ treatise on population first published in
1798 to Lionel Robbins’ famous 1932 definition of economics – as the
‘science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends
and scarce means which have alternative uses’ (Robbins, 1932: 15) – to
the environmentalist arguments from the Club of Rome on the ‘limits to
growth’ (Meadows et al., 1972) and the newer incarnations defining
planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009), commentators have
repeatedly related our understanding of human progress to notions of
abundance and plenty, contrasted with dearth and want.
In this section, we offer three contrasting framings of scarcity, de-
rived from classic political economy: Thomas Malthus and conceptions
of absolute scarcity; David Ricardo and ideas of relative scarcity; and Karl
Marx and what we call political scarcity. It is these three frames, and
their intersections, adaptations and reinterpretations, that in turn
helped guide our analysis of sources on the global land rush.
3.1. Absolute scarcity
In the last major ‘resource crisis’ of the 1970s, arising from dramatic
oil price shocks, thinking was heavily influenced by the birth of the
environmental movement and the idea of there being ‘limits to growth’.
Elements of this thinking have regained popularity, with the idea of
‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). A
clear influence on this work is the intellectual legacy of Thomas Mal-
thus, who is widely credited for introducing the conception of scarcity
into economics (Gammon, 2010).
Malthus is associated with the concept of absolute scarcity, meaning
an immutable physical limitedness of natural resources that are subject
to increasing demands from human society. Despite his
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acknowledgement of variable qualities of land, he claimed there were
limited ‘inventions’ available to agriculture, so significant increases in
production to offset the population crisis were unlikely. Rather, ‘the
power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth
to produce subsistence for man’ (1970 [1798]: 71).
From the 1950s onwards, Malthusian ideas informed debates about
population growth, especially in developing countries (Mamdani, 1981;
Peacock, 1953), and perhaps particularly in populous India and Ban-
gladesh (Paarlberg, 2010). Concerns were expressed that over-
population could create social instability, with countries described as
‘population powder kegs’ (Michaelson, 1981). There were increasingly
persuasive ideas about planetary biophysical limits, the inter-
connectedness of whole ecosystems (Odum, 1969) and the environ-
mental impacts of human activity, such as pollution (Carson, 1962).
Much of this work originated in the conservation movement and the
maturing discipline of ecology (Ross, 1975). Academics and policy-
makers began to discuss the earth’s ‘carrying capacity’ (Seidl and
Tisdell, 1999) and debate the optimal or maximum human population
of the earth (Fraser, 1971). A Malthusian collapse of society seemed
more likely than before: ‘The human race has expanded to a point of
near saturation of its habitat (the earth)’ (Fraser, 1971: 4). Concerns
over a declining availability of farmland were intensified by the in-
cidence of famines and poverty in the midst of economic development
(Sen, 1981).
In the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth, Donella Meadows and
colleagues worried about widespread malnutrition and predicted ‘a
rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and in-
dustrial capacity’, based on the simulations of their systems model
(Meadows et al., 1972: 23). They argued that, with exponential growth,
‘one can move within a very few years from a situation of great
abundance to one of great scarcity’ (1972: 51) and that arable land was
too scarce in absolute terms for productivity increases through in-
tensification to be anything more than a temporary measure.
The ‘neo-Malthusian’ ecologists and economists came to be synon-
ymous with catastrophic predictions and an emphasis on over-
population and the finite nature of resources (Lipton, 1989). Such ideas
are visible in Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968), in Garrett
Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis linking resources and
property rights and in work on land degradation and links between
resource scarcity and conflict (Homer-Dixon, 2010). Such neo-Mal-
thusian ideas influenced welfare, population, conservation and devel-
opment policies (McCarthy and Wolford, 2011; Hartmann, 2010);
sometimes with extreme Malthusian positions arguing for population
control and strong, centrist, state-led intervention to offset the crisis
(e.g. Brown, 1995).
While somewhat more nuanced, contemporary discourses on po-
pulation, resources and development continue to be framed by (neo-)
Malthusian ideas. The idea of ‘planetary boundaries’, while eschewing a
fixity in boundaries, still has at its core the idea of limits and absolute
scarcity. For example, Johan Rockström and colleagues (2009: 48)
warn that ‘humanity may be reaching a point where further agricultural
land expansion at a global scale may seriously threaten biodiversity and
undermine regulatory capacities of the Earth System’. Equally, as we
show below, the scarcity narratives, so common in the debate about the
global land rush, also have clear resonances with earlier debates, being
premised on the notion that there is limited land and water for
humanity to use.
3.2. Relative scarcity
Many who emphasise the limits to the earth’s capacity to support
human activity do not adopt a simple Malthusian perspective, but argue
for the potential for transformation, including through technological
innovation. Scarcity is therefore relative to use, and so scarcity is eco-
nomic, and relative rather than absolute. ‘Scarcity does not mean mere
infrequency of occurrence,’ explains Robbins (1932: 45), ‘… it means
limitation in relation to demand.’
The neoclassical theory of scarcity, especially as it relates to natural
resources, was influenced by earlier work by classical economists, and
David Ricardo in particular. Writing in the early nineteenth century,
Ricardo emphasised that farmland varies in quality. Furthermore,
agricultural productivity is influenced not only by the quality of the
land, but also by the amount of financial capital, and the ‘skill, in-
genuity and instruments in agriculture’ applied (Ricardo, 1821). Thus,
whereas for Malthus the great threat to society was population growth,
Ricardo was more concerned about the progressive decline in the
quantity and quality of farmland (Hussen, 2013).
A relative scarcity framing suggests that society responds to
shortage, through price signals, with institutional and technological
change. This may involve substitution of the scarce resource, whether
staple foods, energy sources or labour; increased recycling of the re-
source and extraction of lower quality sources; or technological change
to increase the efficiency of extraction (Neumayer, 2000). Stefan
Baumgärtner and colleagues (2006: 489) explain how ‘In [neoclassical]
economics, it is generally assumed that continuous substitution is al-
ways possible, at least on the margin’.
For much of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this opti-
mism appeared to be justified. This was a time of cheap natural com-
modities, technological leaps and discoveries of new oil and mineral
reserves (Barbier, 2011). In agriculture, the Asian Green Revolution
could be seen as the ultimate example of a technological response to
scarcity (Hayami and Godo, 2005). Perhaps the high water-mark of this
technological optimism was the 1963 publication of Scarcity and
Growth, in which Harold Barnett and Chandler Morse (1963) argued
that the absolute scarcity hypothesis should be rejected because the
costs of extracted natural resources in the United States had declined
since 1870.
However, few today would claim that resources are infinitely sub-
stitutable or that technological improvements will always offset re-
source limits. Instead, many commentators would argue for some ac-
knowledgement of limits, while arguing for technological solutions. In
the field of agriculture, the work of Esther Boserup on technological
innovation (Boserup, 1993, 1981) and Yujiro Hayami, Vernon Ruttan
and Hans Binswanger (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Binswanger and
Ruttan, 1978) on labour intensification as a response to resource
pressure have been especially influential, entrenching the iconic role
the 1960s–1970s Asian Green Revolution has played in development
thinking.
Michael Lipton (1989) suggests that Malthus’s scarcity narrative and
neoclassical models of technological response to scarcity are part of the
same approach. In his view, society can respond to a Malthusian si-
tuation of population growth putting pressure on land and food supplies
through technological innovation to produce more food (Boserup,
1981) or increase labour productivity (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985;
Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978). New institutional economics further
suggests that changes in institutional arrangement through shifting
transactions costs can result in changes in relative scarcity (Obeng-
Odoom, 2016).
3.3. Political scarcity
None of these conceptualisations of scarcity – whether absolute or
relative or some compromise between them – takes account of the
political nature of scarcity: how scarcity is perceived and ‘manu-
factured’ to suit particular interests (Mehta, 2001); how narratives of
scarcity are deployed in political contests over resources (Scoones,
2010); how historical inequalities due to colonialism, exploitation and
elite control have affected patterns of resource access and control
(Mehta, 2005); and how such patterns are distributed between different
groups of people, with real winners and losers in resource struggles
(Mehta, 2010a,b).
In this view, scarcity is not independent, but is constructed in
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relation to historically-specific patterns and forces of production, dis-
tribution and consumption (Perelman, 1979). Resources are produced
and they are relational; just as humans are part of nature, interlinked
through complex metabolic relations (Moore, 2011). A relational per-
spective on scarcity, centred on its social and political dimensions, also
challenges a ‘systems’ understanding of scarcity, where dialectical
power relations are hidden from view (Harvey, 1974). When scarcity is
seen as political, embedded in the functioning of capitalism, it follows
that states of scarcity that define people’s material needs can be
transcended following social transformation of relations of production
and ownership (Xenos, 1989).
Enclosures, and appropriations of resources as individual, private
property, for example, are the direct result of such capitalist processes,
creating scarcities for some, but resource access for others, differ-
entiated by class, gender, ethnicity and other social axes of difference.
Under contemporary financialised, globalised capitalism, speculative
surplus capital in search of secure investments can, it is argued, lead to
‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003; Hall, 2013), as new
enclosures are created through processes of private accumulation
(White et al., 2012; Obeng-Odoom, 2015b).
Contributions from political ecologists, sociologists and anthro-
pologists extend our understanding of political scarcity, focusing on
knowledge politics and how scarcities are constructed discursively
(Perreault et al., 2015; Mehta, 2010b; Peet and Watts, 1996). The po-
litical ‘manufacture’ of scarcity is seen to frame policy discourse and
action, with questions raised over how claims about resource scarcity
are made (Mehta, 2001). A focus on the micro-practices of resource use
and management equally show how resource scarcity looks very dif-
ferent from the local level than when viewed with a global gaze (cf.
Scoones, 2010; Mehta, 2005). Thus a focus on ‘global’ food security
may do little to alleviate scarcities of food at a local level (Nally, 2015).
Such contemporary critical social science analysis highlights the rela-
tional, social and political dimensions of scarcity in ways that go be-
yond the more structural, class analytics of earlier work, and look at
how knowledge and practice, constructed across scales, intersect with
structural dynamics.
Table 1 offers a highly simplified summary of these three framings
of scarcity, indicating the type of themes we aimed to identify in our
document analysis.
4. Exploring narratives of scarcity
Through a detailed analysis of a range of sources, we explored a set
of narratives relating to the global land rush and interrogated how the
narratives are framed, examining their construction, the actors in-
volved, the interests implicated, and what silences and exclusions are
created.
We define a narrative, following Roe (1994, 1991), as a storyline,
one with a beginning (the definition of the problem), a middle (the
elaboration of its implications) and an ending (the proposed solutions).
The power of narratives is often in their simplicity, their invocation of
metaphors and images, their sense of urgency, and thus their political
appeal and their ability to enlist followers. Narratives are created in a
social and a political milieu by coalitions of actors with interests and
positions. Narrative analysis thus seeks to define some clear storylines
and compare them, tracing the actors who tell the stories and the in-
terests that are associated with them (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).
Narratives are underpinned by framings, defined here as the con-
ceptual constructs that inform and drive narratives (Druckman, 2011;
Entman, 1993). In the previous section, we have identified three con-
trasting framings of scarcity – absolute, relative and political. Framings
may draw on deeper cultural understandings, as well as debates in
public and academic discourse (Benford and Snow, 2000).
Discursive analysis, alive to the use of narrative and framing, reveals
that policy interventions are mutually constructed with social, tech-
nological, economic and political processes (Shackley and Wynne,
1995; Irwin and Wynne, 2003), with epistemic and socio-political or-
ders intertwined through a process of co-production (Jasanoff, 2004).
Such a constructivist perspective points to the knowledge politics in-
herent in defining policy positions, and the patterns of exclusion that
play out. These processes of constructing policy inevitably involve
practices that provide legitimation and authority for preferred narra-
tives. In resource assessments that define scarcity for example, the use
of models and other ‘calculative devices’ (Callon and Muniesa, 2005)
has enormous power. Particular technologies, such as satellite imagery
and Geographic Information Systems, may present data in particular
ways, at certain scales; again, providing forms of evidence that define
certain narratives (Bridge, 2015; Robbins, 2003).
Based on initial searches of material on the global land rush, we first
identified five categories of organization publishing material on the
land rush, and the main actors in each category2: (i) International or-
ganizations (e.g. World Bank, FAO, EU, IFPRI, UK Foresight); (ii)
African regional organizations (e.g. African Development Bank,
NEPAD, the Southern African Development Community); (iii) Investors
and financiers (e.g. Chayton Capital, Rabobank, International Finance
Corporation); (iv) Agribusinesses (e.g. Syngenta, Cargill, Illovo Sugar);
and (v) NGOs and civil society organizations (e.g. Oxfam, ActionAid,
GRAIN, African Biodiversity Network).
We identified the most frequently cited documents from organiza-
tions across our five actor categories covering the period from 2007 to
2013. This period covers the start of the food-fuel-financial crisis and
the policy responses to it, as well as an intense time of actual and
speculated land acquisition in Africa. Those core documents were then
used as the starting point for snowball sampling of references to other
sources. In this way the sense of overlapping ‘discourse coalitions’
(cf. Hajer and Versteeg, 2005) emerged around each of the actor
groups. We complemented this with Google searches of keywords
identified from our initial document analysis. Our sampling was not
comprehensive, and was restricted to English language documents that
were available online. The total of 135 was reached when the identi-
fication of new material had tailed off significantly for each actor
group, suggesting we had reasonably good coverage. The sample for
each group was not the same, but we believe is broadly representative
of sources from each actor group for the study period. The total was
distributed as follows: international organizations (N=37); African
policy (N=18); investor (N=31); agribusiness (N=19) and NGO/
Table 1
Three framings of scarcity.
Framing Key proponents Understanding of scarcity Understanding of the problem
Absolute Ecological economists, resource
ecologists, demographers
Scarcity is physical, real and inescapable The problem is finite limits
Relative Neoclassical, new institutional and
agricultural economists
Scarcity is relative to demand. Physical limits can be mitigated through
economic comparative advantage, science, technology and innovation
The problem is underproduction due to
suboptimal allocation of resources
Political Critical political economists and
sociologists, political ecologists
Scarcity is defined relationally and can be manufactured, both politically
and discursively
The problem is access, inequality and the
historical relations of power
2 Key terms for searches included ‘land grab(bing)’, ‘land rush’ and ‘land investment’.
The main actors were identified in relation to numbers of publications produced and their
citation by others.
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civil society (N= 30). The full list of documents analysed is presented
in the online Supplementary Material linked to this article.
The result was 135 documents and other sources that deal with the
land rush and with agriculture and natural resources more generally,
particularly in Africa. Most set forward either public policy or invest-
ment recommendations for the global or regional community. For each
of the sources, we identified the narratives on land and its use, the
actors involved and their associated interests. Looking at the sources of
evidence presented, we examined how the narratives were generated,
and what sources were used. And, digging deeper, we explored which of
the three underlying scarcity framings (or combinations) were evident.
To help understand the authors’ underlying perspectives on scarcity, we
looked for key words and phrases that signify particular positions, such
as ‘yield gap’ or ‘limits’. Through the document analysis, we examined
how the three framings discussed above contributed to the construction
of narrative storylines, and how these frames are in turn constructed
through various narrative devices and sources of evidence.
Our analysis of each document was qualitative, and we did not
undertake any quantitative assessment of frequency of use of terms and
phrases, nor did we derive a quantitative assessment of the relative
importance of different framings and narratives for different actor
groups. We use exemplar quotes in our assessment below, derived from
many possible alternatives, but believe these provide good illustrations
of the narrative being discussed. Our assessment emerges from deep
immersion in the many thousands of pages of material, and knowledge
of the wider land rush debate in this period (e.g. Hall et al., 2015; White
et al., 2012).
5. Four narrative themes
Despite the broad range of actor groups represented in the material,
our analysis revealed remarkable convergence by most of them (except
civil society and NGOs) on a single overarching narrative, expressed
through four dominant narrative themes. These themes broadly relate
to the narrative structure, with a beginning that highlights the problem
of limits and urgency; a middle, which presents a context of relative
abundant and idle land; and an end, centred on solutions around in-
vestment and capturing comparative advantage. While the overall
narrative storyline was common to all actor groups except civil society
organizations and NGOs, different actors had different emphases, as
discussed below. In our analysis, in relation to each theme, we ask what
versions and combinations of the scarcity frames introduced above are
evident; which are the dominant ones; how are they expressed; and
what frames are excluded?
5.1. Limits and urgency
All five actor groups use the same narrative theme of crisis to open
their position on the global land rush. The sense of limits, tipping
points, irreversibility and boundaries being reached is repeatedly em-
phasised across the sources. These broadly draw on a (neo-)Malthusian
framing, highlighting absolute scarcity.
The narrative often starts with ‘the challenge’, usually focused
around the forecast need to feed 9 billion people by 2050. A confluence
of factors is pointed to, which the actors argue will result in potential
catastrophe unless urgent responses follow. For example: ‘The global
food system will experience an unprecedented confluence of pressures
over the next 40 years….This is a unique time in history – decisions
made now and over the next few decades will disproportionately in-
fluence the future’ (UK Foresight, 2011: 9, 13). The FAO’s 2011 review
of The State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agri-
culture argued: ’In some … areas, the accumulation of environmental
impacts in key land and water systems has now reached the point where
production and livelihoods are compromised’ (FAO, 2011b: 4). The
CEO of Unilever, Paul Polman, emphasised ‘natural limits’:
“Food security has to be seen as part of the wider question of how
we can live sustainably within the natural limits of the planet … We
are already consuming natural resources at a rate faster than the
planet’s capacity to replenish them” (Polman, 2011).
Some offer distinctly Malthusian overtones. In a 2012 newsletter to
investors, Jeremy Grantham, the co-founder of the investment man-
agement firm GMO, said:
“We are five years into a severe global food crisis that is very un-
likely to go away. It will threaten poor countries with increased
malnutrition and starvation and even collapse. Resource squabbles
and waves of food-induced migration will threaten global stability
and global growth. This threat is badly underestimated by almost
everybody and all institutions with the possible exception of some
military establishments … We simply cannot have exponential
growth on a finite planet” (Grantham, 2012: 2, 14).
The imperative for action, and the justification for their business
contributions, is emphasised by large agribusiness. Two of the largest,
Syngenta and Cargill, offered this on their websites:
“Over the next 20 years, we will need to feed another 1.8 billion
people. Calorie demand will grow even faster, as diets in some
countries increasingly shift to meat. In much of the world, agri-
cultural land is limited and water scarce. So tomorrow’s growers will
have to produce much more food and animal feed with today’s
limited natural resources” (Syngenta, 2013, paras. 5–6).
“By 2050, an anticipated 70 percent boost in global food production
will be necessary to meet the world’s growing demand for food. To
protect the environment, most of the increase in food production
will need to come from increased yields and productivity rather than
from the use of additional land” (Cargill, 2011, para. 4).
Of the iconic figures that are repeated continuously in narratives on
the global land rush, two stand out: the estimate of a human population
of nine billion by 2050 and the need to double food production in the
same period. These figures are repeatedly cited, although their origins
remain obscure. For example:
“Every day sees 220,000 new mouths to feed, meaning 80 million
additional people a year. Global population today is about 7 billion.
By 2050, it will probably balloon up to 9.3 billion. According to
FAO, ‘the world must double food production by 2050’. But already
in 2011, some 950 million people experienced hunger. During the
same period, 5 million babies died from hunger. Can we produce
enough food for all? Will we run out of land?” (SIFCA, 2012: 10)
Thus, with different emphases and intentions in mind, the sources
across all actor groups highlighted how crises were imminent, storms
were in the offing, boundaries were being transgressed and urgent ac-
tion was required, supported by iconic facts and figures. For interna-
tional organizations, investors and agri-businesses, this justified inter-
vention and investment; for NGOs and civil society the urgency of
approaching limits was deployed to spur social action and shifts in
development paradigm. Sometimes, as in most of the commentaries
from African regional policymakers, this urgent scenario of crisis was
presented in more local or regional terms; for all other actors, it was
presented as a more global challenge.
5.2. Abundance, emptiness and under-use
At this point in the story the actors diverge, and so too does the
underlying framing. Most of the actor groups now go on to contrast the
global scenario of absolute scarcity and impending crisis, with relative
local abundance of a fundamental resource – land – in sub-Saharan
Africa. In justifying the need to invest in land, particularly in large-scale
land deals, particular representations of land and its use are offered.
Relative to the growing shortage of land globally, land in target
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investment areas was described in most sources as abundant, empty,
idle and underutilised. Scarcity (global) and abundance (local, African)
are thus juxtaposed as part of the narrative. This narrative theme is
exemplified in the highly influential World Bank studies that argued for
investments in areas where land is ‘available’ and has high ‘potential’.
For example: ‘Areas [in sub-Saharan Africa] of low population density
with good agricultural potential represent untapped reserves for con-
tinued expansion of area’ (World Bank, 2007: 231).
What is meant by ‘available’ and ‘potential’ is highly disputed (see
below), yet the argument took hold. As regions and countries compete
for investment, the idea of ‘untapped potential’ becomes significant.
This is an argument put forward by African regional actors keen on
attracting investment. The President of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) told audiences in China of well-watered
arable land in West Africa, noting that ‘ECOWAS governments are
willing to promote collaborations to unlock the huge untapped poten-
tials and are hereby extending an invitation to Chinese private sector
investors to invest in commercial farming and agro-processing’
(ECOWAS, 2011: 9).
Other African regional organizations agreed. The African Union’s
Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme
(CAADP) argued that ‘… there is substantial untapped potential for the
development of the continent’s water and land resources for increasing
agricultural production’ (NEPAD, 2003: 24) and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) concurred: ‘The continent is
endowed with many natural resources, including plentiful land and
fertile soils, oil and minerals’ (UNECA, 2013: 8).
While abundance, emptiness and under-use was emphasised, again
based on figures of often unknown origin, there are qualifications of-
fered by some. Some African policymakers and analysts acknowledged
water scarcity, soil degradation and declining per-capita land avail-
ability across the region. Meanwhile, aware of the wider debate about
‘land grabbing’, some international organizations, such as IFPRI (2009),
FAO (2011b) and the World Bank (2011, 2009), were careful to note
that some ‘available’ land might already be used by poor people or
pastoralists, be degraded, or require massive investment to make pro-
ductive. Such sensitivities were shown by private investors too. The
CEO of Emergent Asset Management was, for example, quoted as
saying: ‘We are not taking land away. We buy or lease operational farms
that are undercapitalised, or we start projects on land that is fallow to
produce food, which in itself creates many local jobs’ (Whitby, 2010:
44).
The narrative theme on abundance, emptiness and under-use was
therefore selectively applied. It appears more prominently early on in
our period of analysis, before media exposure of ‘land grabs’ heightened
awareness of problems. For many African regional organizations and
policymakers, making the case for investment remained high on the
agenda, but for international organizations and investors/agribusi-
nesses greater caution is shown, even if the basic argument for large-
scale investment – taking advantage of under-used resources – was still
deployed.
5.3. A technical and investment solution
After telling a story about global crisis and local abundance, most
narratives end with a suggested technical and investment solution, ar-
guing that there is a way out from the Malthusian bind. In this way, the
underlying framing combines an element of absolute scarcity with the
technological optimism of relative scarcity. Yet there is little room for
politics in these commentaries. Some actors, such as the World Bank
and the former head of the UN World Food Programme, acknowledged
inequalities in food entitlements and purchasing power; however, while
access, equity and distribution are (almost) universally acknowledged
as important, the mainstream discourse does not separate these social
concerns from an emphasis on increased food production as a solution.
Thus production is presented as the answer to poverty and food
insecurity both locally and globally, to be achieved largely through
improvements in technology and greater investment. This narrative
theme dominates the sources from international organizations, in-
vestors and agribusiness actors. They propose a reliance on technology
to intensify agricultural production of food and animal feed, and
thereby mitigate or escape the limits imposed by natural resource
scarcity and keep ahead of population growth. For example: “With the
closing of the land frontier across much of the developing world and
continuing strong demographic pressures, gains in land productivity –
and sustainable land management – will become fundamental” (World
Bank, 2007: 227) or “If used in proper association with suitable tech-
nologies [land and water] have the capacity to enable global agri-
cultural production to continue outpacing the growing demand despite
the declining per capita availability” (NEPAD, 2003: 23).
A recurrent metaphor is the idea of a ‘gap’ between a potential level
of agricultural production and the actual yields achieved by farmers.
This yield gap is seen to be particularly large in Africa. The work of
Günther Fischer, Mahendra Shah and colleagues at the International
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria has been
especially influential (Fischer and Shah, 2010). Quotes from the re-
viewed sources that illustrate the concern with solving Africa’s yield
gap include: ‘If all current land and water were managed optimally,
output could double in the regions where the yield gap is less than 50
percent’ (FAO, 2011b: 35), and ‘Many developing regions … have large
gaps relative to their potential. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, crop
yields reached only about 27 percent of their economic potential in
2005’ (FAO, 2012: 105).
Two economists from the International Finance Corporation called
for ‘massive’ amounts of investment in agriculture to meet the scarcity
challenge. They argued:
“You’ve probably already heard the Malthusian projections tar-
geting our planet’s finite capacity to feed a growing population –
projected to reach 9 billion by 2050 – in the face of dwindling re-
sources of suitable land and water in productive climates … by
working together, the public and private sectors can help deliver
abundant, affordable, and nutritious food for all” (Vegarra and
Moses, 2012: 6).
The African Development Bank was equally assertive on the need
for technical solutions:
“Clearly, raising agricultural productivity including that of
smallholder farmers is a key component in reducing poverty and
hunger in Africa … In the long term, enhancing agricultural
productivity together with mitigating and adapting to climate
changes should be the primary focus of food security initiatives”
(Salami et al., 2011: 3).
While broad narratives of scarcity framed the problem, the direc-
tions of future pathways of development were more open to debate, and
reflected particular interests. Not surprisingly, agribusiness companies
argued for their own technologies, while financial institutions empha-
sised investment. Many of the actors, such as the World Bank, went
beyond mere technological optimism to call for an accompanying im-
provement in incentives, institutions and infrastructure, echoing the
success of the Green Revolution in Asia. And many in the international
agencies, under labels such as ‘sustainable intensification’, hedged their
bets, and avoided the more political discussions about the direction of
technological development and its distributional consequences. Yet
nearly all actors saw the solution as a technical and institutional fix.
5.4. Comparative global opportunities
The same group of actors frequently presented the argument for
intervention in terms of a ‘shared’, ‘global’ crisis, with solutions being
forged through ‘partnerships’ and ‘inclusive’ approaches to develop-
ment. Africa was singled out as a particularly promising investment
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destination, and a source for ‘feeding the world’. The former head of the
UN World Food Programme, Josette Sheeran, noted: ‘You can look at
hunger as a Malthusian nightmare, or you can look it as a tremendous
opportunity because everyone has to eat’ (Hotter, 2012). Similarly, the
landmark EU report commented:
“[C]ompeting claims [for land] place a high value on natural re-
sources. This presents real opportunities for economic growth in
countries endowed with vast natural resources, and in particular
those with a large productivity gap – which is the case of many of
the poorer countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa” (EU, 2012:
88).
One result of the ‘technical apparatus’ (Fine, 2010) of scarcity-
centred economics is the idea of comparative advantage, and so the
justification for intervention in a place (Africa), in favour of the globe,
as part of ‘shared development’. This narrative theme is particularly
appealing to global investors and agribusinesses who were keen to
justify their interventions in Africa in particular. As in the narrative
theme addressing land abundance, Africa’s potential was much hyped
(Obeng-Odoom, 2015a), particularly in relation to land and water-
constrained countries wishing to meet their food, feed or fuel require-
ments. Debates about the opportunities and dangers of land investments
were enhanced by the mapping efforts of the Land Matrix group
(Anseeuw et al., 2013; Rulli et al., 2013), with data from its public
database frequently being quoted, despite many questions being raised
about its veracity, at least initially (Scoones et al., 2013).
The argument goes that there is mutual advantage – and profit – to
be gained. For example, a global investor commented: ‘We are positive
about the role that Africa, with its vast agricultural potential and re-
sources, could play in addressing the growing global demand for food’
(Mouton, in Zeder Investments, 2012: 6). Similarly, the EU argued:
‘While land deals give rise to concerns they also provide opportunities.
Investors may introduce new technologies and skills, expedite the de-
velopment of contextualised production systems with higher pro-
ductivity, and spark innovation’ (EU, 2012: 5).
In finance and investment circles, land was projected as the ‘new
gold’ (Brown, quoted in Buckholtz and Delay, 2012), and a safe and
secure investment with good returns. For example:
“Agcapita believes farmland is a safe investment, that supply is
shrinking and that unprecedented demand for ‘food, feed and fuel’
will continue to move crop prices higher over the long-term”
(Agcapita, 2013) and “We expect strong investment performance to
continue across the world as fundamentals of food production, se-
curity and [demand for] renewable energy all impact on the finite
area of global farmland” (InvestAg Savills, 2011: 4).
Africa was singled out as a particularly promising investment des-
tination, with land as an ‘asset class’ (Schaffnit-Chatterjee, 2012: 1). For
example: ‘Africa has a tremendous future in terms of agriculture. Africa
could feed much of the world’ (CEO of Aslan Global Management,
quoted in Charles, 2012), and: ‘Looking at global agriculture from a
long-term perspective it seems that Africa has a huge opportunity to
feed both itself and the world in the coming decades’ (GreenWorld,
2013).
Some of the thinking behind these statements is revealed in a 2011
research report from Rabobank, a significant financier of international
agricultural projects. This argued that corporations must rethink their
commodity sourcing strategies in this new and unprecedented era of
scarcity. Because the world’s farmers had become squeezed by low
producer prices on one side and high input prices on the other, went the
argument, they were unlikely to be able to respond to price rises by
increasing production. Therefore, in order to secure supply of food and
other agri-commodities, corporations turned to investing in land,
working directly with farmers, setting up greenfield production and
other operations along the supply chain. Actors involved in large-scale
farmland acquisition ‘all recognise the over-arching rationale that
scarcity will become an increasingly regular feature of agricultural
commodity markets in the future’ (Rabobank International, 2011: 18).
6. Constructing narratives, silencing politics
The previous section offered an overview of the dominant narrative
themes seen consistently across four of our actor groups – international
organizations, African regional organizations, investors/financiers and
agribusinesses. These were underpinned with framings that combine
absolute scarcity with economic ideas of relative scarcity and the im-
portance of technological change and investment in addressing limits.
This section asks: how were these narratives constructed, and what
political effects did this have? What exclusions of alternative framings
resulted? The section proceeds then to identify two marginal narratives
identified during our analysis and associated with the NGO/civil society
actor group. We explore how these offer hints of an alternative political
scarcity framing, but also point to its limits.
6.1. Constructing narratives
A variety of approaches to constructing the dominant narrative
themes is observed in the sources investigated. One example is the
deployment of iconic figures, based on population projections, food
balance estimates, assessments of land degradation extent, or assumed
productivity and yield gaps. These are frequently repeated in the
sources, yet their origins and basis of calculation are rarely addressed.
They become iconic markers for a position, but their validity goes un-
questioned, despite often large bodies of research that dispute their
utility (cf. Leach and Mearns, 1996; Stott and Sullivan, 2000; Scoones,
2001; Keeley and Scoones, 2003). The power of global, aggregated
assessments, and the scenario modelling often associated with these, is
also enormously powerful, and becomes central to global discourses
(Hulme et al., 2011; Scoones, 2009), including around the global land
rush.
Figures and maps on land use and availability are particularly im-
portant in the evidence base for the dominant narratives identified.
These are often generated at large scales, extrapolating from limited
data inputs. Assessments of utilisation are based on factors visible from
satellite imagery, and so may exclude uses such as mobile pastoralism
or shifting agriculture. The models from IIASA and the Land Matrix
became especially important in the construction of land policy narra-
tives – from those favouring large-scale investments and from those
opposing alike. Yet the limitations of such assessments, while widely
discussed (cf. Scoones et al., 2013; Oya, 2013), was rarely acknowl-
edged in the sources. Again, a simple figure or a startling map is suf-
ficient to make the point, reinforcing a narrative position.
A similar problem arises from arguments around yield and pro-
ductivity ‘gaps’. The assumption that a new type of investment, por-
trayed as efficient, modern and high-tech, can overcome such assumed
gaps is often made. Yet the notion of a yield gap has been widely cri-
tiqued (Sumberg, 2012). Estimates are usually derived from comparing
on-station agronomic conditions with the field settings of farmers.
While in theory much higher productivity levels can be reached, this
requires a whole series of technological, agroecological and economic
conditions that may never be realistically achieved in field settings, no
matter what the scale or level of capitalisation of the farm.
Modelling the availability of land only on the basis of what can be
seen in satellite images is obviously prone to error. Equally, developing
yield models based on potentials rather than likely levels, given dif-
ferences in resource quality, infrastructure and technology attributes
and so on, adds another level of uncertainty. Yet these models, parti-
cularly when they appear in multi-coloured maps or dramatic graphics,
have enormous power, and the uncertainties and qualifications are
buried in the footnotes. Models are of course only constructs that may
or may not have some analytical utility in thinking about more complex
phenomena. But when their assumptions are flawed – whether in terms
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of the behaviour of individuals in perfect markets or the availability and
potential of land – they become potentially dangerous and misleading,
obscuring other insights. As the Committee on Food Security’s High
Level Panel report on land concluded: ‘The satellite and aerial imagery
used in bio-physical surveys is blind to the rights and institutions that
govern how land is actually used on the ground’ (HLPE, 2011: 9).
Parables of success in other places – in this instance most frequently
the example of the Asian Green Revolution – are often paraded as part
of the construction of narratives. These provide a counterpoint and il-
lustration of an alternative that justifies the solution presented in the
narrative. Success stories are usually problematic as comparators, as
they emerge from very particular conditions; often ones that have much
larger variation than is admitted (Sumberg et al., 2012). As a rhetorical
technique they are important, but as sources of evidence they are often
found wanting. The case of the Asian Green Revolution is a case in
point. As decades of research has shown, there have been huge varia-
tion in outcomes, by location, groups of people and so on, with a whole
array of ‘green revolution’ pathways evident across Asia (Harriss-White
and Harriss, 2007; Hazell, 2009), with no justification for the use of a
singular ‘Asian’ success story to contrast with, or advocate for, the
African setting (Thompson and Scoones, 2009).
Thus a series of models, metrics and assessments are generated by
certain socio-technical practices, including the use of satellite imagery,
geographic-information-system models and yield assessments, which
generate eye-catching and persuasive figures. These forms of data act as
‘anchoring devices’ (Van der Sluijs et al., 1998) in the boundary work
that goes on between science and policy in the construction of knowl-
edge for policy (Gieryn, 1999). Figures, maps and models are presented
as objective and scientific, part of evidence-based policy. This process
of ‘mutual construction’ (Shackley and Wynne, 1995) or ‘co-production’
(Jasanoff, 2004) generates a knowledge politics that creates particular
types of ‘biopolitical’ knowledge, knowledge subjects and social and
political orders. These forms of governmentality (cf. Foucault et al.,
1991; Jessop, 2006) necessarily define the world – and in this case in
relation to resource scarcity – in a way that excludes other versions and
realities. In the period between 2007 and 2013, the dominant narrative,
generated through a variety of mechanisms and promulgated by four
major, and powerful, actor groups, justified an argument about the
necessity of land investment in Africa. Deploying representations of
scarcity in different ways, this provided the core discursive support for
the global land rush at its peak.
6.2. Alternative, marginalised narratives
By identifying the dominant narrative and its underlying framing, a
key question raised is: what is excluded? Across the sources demon-
strating the key narrative themes, a ‘political scarcity’ framing was al-
most completely absent. Only the NGOs and civil society groups (9
sources) embraced a political understanding of scarcity within their
framing of the global land rush. Two narratives were identified: one
focused on ‘food sovereignty’ and local economic solutions; and the
other on global inequalities of production and consumption.
The food sovereignty narrative tells a story of local scarcities, ar-
guing that these can be addressed through local, indigenous economic
development. It rejects a wider, global discourse of scarcity, presenting
it as a political construction that results from the inequities of global
capitalism. Such a position was articulated by AFSA (the Alliance for
Food Sovereignty in Africa) (2011) and La Via Campesina (2012), for
example, and Friends of the Earth Africa (2010:5), who argued: “Food is
a natural right and agricultural products should not be treated as
commodities whose ultimate purpose is the generation of business
profits rather than meeting needs of the people. Family and small-scale
farmers should be encouraged and strengthened”.
The narrative concerned with global inequalities also highlights the
importance of local farming solutions. Scarcities, it is argued, are cre-
ated through over-consumption in some parts of the world, and are
imposed on others. The focus turns to demand-side changes, including a
reduction in resource consumption in rich countries. For example,
Oxfam (2011:4) argued: “Appalling inequities … plague the food
system from farm to fork”, while the IF campaign launched in 2013
claimed that “…rigged rules and deep inequalities… allow a few to
make billions while leaving hardworking poor farmers – especially
women and their children – and vulnerable and ordinary people ev-
erywhere to face the highest prices in a generation” (Enough Food For
Everyone IF, 2013: 12).
As noted earlier, in both cases the political discourse was combined
with a premise of ‘absolute scarcity’ in terms of ecological or planetary
limits, which must be addressed through local, often technical agroe-
cological, solutions in the case of food sovereignty; or approaches to
redistribution in the narratives focused on global inequalities. In both
cases they focus on local-level solutions – creating new forms of local
economy and food sovereignty or addressing over-consumption in
particular locales – without necessarily attending to wider structural,
political conditions (Bernstein, 2013). While they reject globalised
versions of scarcity, their frames nevertheless often draw on arguments
of limits, and their solutions focus on technological, investment and
institutional options, even if these are alternative to the mainstream.
Thus agroecology is advocated rather than high-tech, industrial agri-
culture, but the framing of the wider problem often remains tech-
nology-centred. Despite the NGO and civil society organization authors
positioning themselves as in opposition to ‘land grabs’ and large-scale
capitalist agriculture, the articulation of a political scarcity framing
therefore remains underdeveloped.
7. Reframing scarcity: bringing politics back in
Across our sources a dominant set of narrative themes emerged,
constructed through a range of mechanisms and promoted by a pow-
erful group of actors, and underpinned by a framing that draws on
theoretical concepts of absolute and relative scarcity. An alternative,
often poorly articulated, challenge to this is found among sources
produced by NGOs and civil society organizations. While containing
elements of the dominant narrative themes, notably a diagnosis of
problems centred on an absolute scarcity theme of ecological crisis and
a commitment to technical solutions of different sorts, these narratives
did contain a more political dimension, pointing to the consequences of
inequality and the advantages of locally-driven development. But in
relation to the framing of political scarcity introduced earlier, only
certain elements were included. What then might an alternative nar-
rative, informed by a more comprehensive political scarcity framing,
entail, and how might this challenge the dominant powerful narratives
of the global land rush?
To articulate a political framing of scarcity, and associated narra-
tives for policy, means going beyond the empirical material, and re-
turning to our earlier outline of what a political scarcity framing im-
plies. At the centre of a political framing of scarcity is the contention
that we must restructure the relationships between resources, the state
and society. If scarcities are constitutive of social, political and eco-
nomic relationships within society, a new relationship between nature,
society and economy has to be negotiated. In a political view, as ela-
borated above, scarcity is constructed in relation to historically-specific
patterns and forces of production, distribution and consumption. In this
way, capitalism generates scarcities through processes of accumulation,
but such scarcities have an impact on profits, and so subsequent dif-
ferential patterns of accumulation across societies and between nations.
This way of framing scarcity requires paying attention to how re-
sources and the associated flows of benefits are distributed. Scarcity for
one person may be abundance for another, and scarcities are indeed
constructed through unequal access, across all scales (Mehta, 2010a).
Scarcity as a relational concept cannot be apprehended only by simple
metrics or models that focus on absolute scarcities (resource avail-
ability, gaps, limits and so on). Such assessments need to be embedded
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in a much deeper understanding of resource control (Peluso and Lund,
2011) and access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). We must ask how resources
are distributed across different groups within society, and across the
globe, and through what social relations and institutions, in whose in-
terests and with what material effects (Li, 2014).
Scarcities thus have class, gender and generational dimensions that
have major consequences, suggesting a political ecology perspective
that takes resource dynamics seriously, but locates these in wider so-
cial-political understandings (Peet and Watts, 1996; Rocheleau et al.,
1996). Scarcities of course emerge historically, and in particular places.
In Africa, present scarcities are rooted in colonialism and are perpe-
tuated through unequal trade relationships, often reinforced by aid and
development interventions that favour one resource use or user group
over others (Moyo et al., 2012). Scarcities have therefore been created
by such imbalances, through excess production and consumption in
some parts of the world, and poverty and inequality in others, for ex-
ample (Jackson, 2011).
Framings that accept a position of relative scarcity may argue for
technological and market interventions to overcome absolute scarcities,
but such interventions also may generate new social and political
scarcities. Technologies and markets are never neutral, yet proponents
neglect the inevitable favouring of certain actors and disadvantaging of
others. The mantras of ‘sustainable intensification’ or ‘responsible in-
novation’, for example, carry politics and power with them, and can act
to exclude as well as include (Loos et al., 2014; Stilgoe et al., 2013).
Debating the directions of development and their distributional im-
plications is a vital step (STEPS, 2010). We must always be clear about
the political consequences of scarcity-driven interventions on the
structural relations within a society, set within the wider political
economy that defines these. Scarcity is not universal, given, fixed or
determining, but context-specific, socially constructed, politically con-
tested, variable and dynamic; and therefore, always subject to con-
testation, negotiation and contentious politics, as different groups mo-
bilise around resource issues (Scoones, 2016).
A political scarcity lens therefore draws attention neither just to
finite limits (which of course exist), nor just to the potential opportu-
nities of transformation through markets and technologies (also im-
portant in some contexts), but also to the relational qualities of multiple
scarcities, being constructed in particular ways by different actors with
particular interests. Such an approach goes substantially beyond the
narratives promoted by NGOs and civil society organizations during
2007–2013 towards a more comprehensive political scarcity framing at
the heart of a critique of the global land rush and its dominant framings.
This has major implications for the debate on Africa’s land rush. A
switch of focus from land availability or yield gap assessments, with the
assumption that improved efficiency and production will arise from a
certain style of investment, to a political scarcity framing would em-
phasise investing in the negotiating capacities of different actors, and
most notably disempowered local communities, whose perspectives are
currently excluded from the models, assessment and technical apprai-
sals of most policy debates and investment initiatives. A technical un-
derstanding of absolute scarcity can feed in, to define limits, tipping
points and trade-offs, but not dominate. Instead, a more open delib-
eration around how scarcities are understood by different actors would
allow more focused debates on the direction of development (for ex-
ample, is large-scale farm investment the most appropriate option in
this setting?) and the distribution of benefits (who wins and loses from
different investment models?).
Our analysis of the 135 sources showed the dominance of absolute
and relative scarcity representations of Africa’s land rush, and an ab-
sence of nuanced political scarcity interpretations, even within alter-
native positions critical of land investments. Recognising that scarcity
narratives are constructed does not mean that scarcities are not ‘real’;
rather, we show that policy narratives are subject to processes of con-
struction, and that a knowledge politics is at play, with very tangible,
material effects. Framings and narratives matter in policy and
investment behaviour and, as we have seen, some have greater influ-
ence than others, with direct effects on how problems are understood
and solutions designed and promoted – by governments, development
agencies and private-sector actors. Opening up this debate, with a more
explicit focus on political scarcities is, we argue, urgently required. For
African settings – seen as both a source of abundant resources and a site
where global scarcities may be resolved, as well as where local scar-
cities are being experienced most acutely – a political scarcity framing
on the global land rush, and resource questions more broadly, is es-
sential.
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